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Abstract:
This study conducts a qualitative analysis of the objectives, forms, current trends, and characteristics of North Korean cyber terror at-
tacks and suggests a way to ensure further progress towards a successful international policy response. Despite the capricious changes 
that have recently occurred within the international political atmosphere, North Korea continues to constitute a threat to internation-
al stability through its ongoing advancement of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. The difficulty of attribution and the 
relatively low costs associated with launching cyber offensives make cyber terrorism an attractive option for North Korea. In an effort 
to direct attention to these circumstances, this study aims to share explicit experts’ perspectives in the field of cyberterrorism in South 
Korea. Consequently, the study purports to contribute to existing academic discussion and practices on cyber terror and cybercrime. 
Furthermore, this study adopts perspectives from criminological theoretical frameworks and the network theory of world politics to 
substantiate a more comprehensive view of North Korea’s cyberterrorism which considers the multifaceted and asymmetrical nature 
of cyberterrorism within the context of postmodern international politics.
Introduction
     Within the 21st century, cyberspace has become an area of importance in international security. Cy-
ber offensives such as cybercrime, cyber-espionage, cyber-war, and “hacktivism” have become standard 
procedures for adversarial states and non-state actors to establish their calculated and contentious objec-
tives. While cyber-attacks were originally deemed to have been perpetrated by individuals or unaffiliat-
ed organizations, state endorsed cyber offensives have also become widespread. The relatively low costs of 
launching offensives work in tandem with the difficulty of targeted actors to attribute the attacks to a par-
ticular actor and retaliate with a commensurate level of force in order to make cyber-attack an attractive 
option for pariah states that have limited military and economic resources. North Korea has reportedly de-
veloped advanced cyber warfare capabilities and its substantial workforce is allegedly involved in “the In-
ternet’s dark side activities” with the explicit support of the state (Kshetri, 2014). Despite the increase in 
threats to cybersecurity, the fact that there is no single definition of cyberterrorism in international so-
ciety as well as in academia and in relevant international cases remains a prominent problem in terror-
ism studies (Kim, 2017). However, it is possible to extract certain characteristics from past attacks widely 
regarded as examples of cyberterrorism to reach a definition suitable for the purposes of this research.
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 Choi et al. (2018) indicate that terrorism in cyberspace would be considered a criminal activity with or-
ganized actions and those who have a shared group identity to achieve their ideological goals. From this 
viewpoint, cases of North Korean cyber-attacks against institutions in other states involving highly trained 
North Korean citizens and an organized system can be defined as a form of cyberterrorism in addition to cy-
ber-attack.
      While the general North Korean population has restricted access to advanced Internet infrastructure, 
the country has a highly trained cyber army as well as a long history of launching cyber offensives upon 
other states. In 2009, North Korean assaults that derived from servers in Georgia, Austria, Germany, and 
the U.S., shut down computers in the presidential palace in Seoul for several days. On July 4 2009, hack-
ers attacked servers in the U.S. Treasury Department and the Secret Service (Mauro, 2009; Warf, 2015). 
Similar Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that occurred in 2011 afflicted the South Korean gov-
ernment and bank sites, and in 2012, South Korea’s conservative JoongAng Daily was hacked. Following 
this sequence of cyber-attacks, on March 20, 2013, North Korea initiated waves of cyber assaults using mal-
ware against South Korean banks and broadcast stations. It was confirmed that North Korea incapacitated 
48,000 computers and paralyzed networks. However, they tenaciously sought to conceal their digital trail 
and firmly denied involvement (Cho, 2013; Choe, 2013; Warf, 2015). In March 2013, North Korean hack-
ers disabled numerous ATMs in Seoul, unleashing a malware known as Dark Seoul, which was designed 
to evade antiviral software. Similar onslaughts were reported against South Korea’s presidential palace, 
military websites, the U.S. Treasury Department, and the Federal Trade Commission (Sang-Hun, 2013a, 
2013b; Warf, 2015). These high-profile cyber-attacks have been accompanied by other attacks widely re-
garded as being perpetrated by North Korea. In many cases, the target of North Korea’s cyber offensives 
has been South Korea. According to the Korean Ministry of Defense, hacking attempts against South Ko-
rean forces increased from 4,000 cases in 2017 to approximately 5,000 cases in 2018, and then ascended to 
9,533 cases in 2019 (VoaKorea, 2020).
     Although South Korea has often borne the brunt of North Korean cyber terror attacks, North Korean 
cyber-attacks also pose a threat to international security, with the United States also a main target of at-
tack.  The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proclaimed that the North Korean gov-
ernment has been perpetrating cyber terror attacks on news agencies as well as on key infrastructure fa-
cilities, and the form of these acts of cyberterrorism have included destruction of data and data theft (Kim, 
2017).
      The rationale for North Korea’s use of cyber war power as a strategic weapon is that it is cost-effective, 
easy to utilize, it spreads quickly, and it can cause huge repercussions. Moreover, there is no need for phys-
ical infiltration, anonymity allows for secrecy, and sanctions and retribution are difficult (Lee, 2009b; Lim 
et al., 2014). Considering these advantages, North Korea’s use of the asymmetrical characteristics of cyber-
space to further its economic and political agenda is only to be expected. Erlendson (2013) asserted as North 
Korea is integrating its cyber strategies into the whole military and national security strategy, cyber war 
power in North Korea is a strategic weapon and key resource for the state to reach its objectives (Lim et al., 
2014). This makes it possible to conclude that the motivation and purpose behind the North Korean cyber 
terror attacks are within the parameters of the state’s long-term policy objectives, and that the perpetrated 
cyber-attacks will multiply in number as well as in form in the future.
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      Consequently, a thorough analysis of North Korean cyber-attacks, along with a systematized policy re-
sponse are necessary in order to mitigate the effects of further cyber-attacks. Unfortunately, there remains 
a general lack of academic discussion on North Korea’s cyber-attacks. In an effort to direct attention to 
these circumstances, the current study utilizes criminological theoretical frameworks to conduct an anal-
ysis of the objectives, forms, current trends, and characteristics of North Korean cyber terror attacks, and 
suggests a way to ensure further progress towards formulating an international policy response. Assessing 
a nation’s ability to project power through cyber means is problematic, primarily because it is largely at-
tributed to the secrecy of those capabilities within government departments and the diffusion of responsi-
bilities through those bureaucracies (Warf, 2015). Moreover, information related to North Korea’s cyber pol-
icies is severely limited due to the country’s reclusiveness, making reliance on the allegations of a select few 
defectors inevitable. It is also difficult to determine the validity of much of the information that has been 
disclosed thus far (Lee et al., 2016).
      Recognizing that obtaining first-hand evidence can be quite difficult, this study utilizes a problem-cen-
tered expert interview approach to conduct a qualitative analysis of the North Korean cyber-attacks. It then 
moves on to suggest a path forward in international policy response. The study purports to contribute to ex-
isting academic discussions on cyber terror and cybercrime. In addition, it also adopts perspectives from the 
network theory of world politics to substantiate a more comprehensive view of North Korea’s cyber-attacks 
which considers the multifaceted and asymmetrical nature of cyber-attacks within the context of postmod-
ern international politics.
Theoretical Frameworks: Theoretical Applications
      The development of the Internet has enabled private and non-state actors to perpetrate cyber-attacks 
against actors much more powerful than themselves. The North Korean government remains a top actor in 
the orchestration of cyber-attacks upon other states. This section applies the network theory of world poli-
tics to offer a more contemporary political context of North Korea’s cyber-attacks. The findings will be used 
in the next section to analyze experts’ individual views about policy response and to suggest a way of action 
that is currently not being addressed by states.
      In light of the potential ramifications of cyber-attacks on international society, a closer examination of 
the motivations behind North Korea’s cyber-attacks is necessary. Thus, analysis using the network theo-
ry of world politics is followed by elements of differential opportunity theory to describe the nature of North 
Korean foreign policy, North Korean subculture and ideology, and social learning mechanisms.
Network Theory of World Politics
      The network theory of world politics provides perspectives about the concept of power that is crucial to 
the understanding of North Korea’s cyber-attacks in an international setting and in the formulation of pol-
icy response. Political network analyses contribute to a shift of focus from a traditional institutional ap-
proach of the state to multi-sectoral policy arenas, which can refer to the emerging formation of a new kind 
of polity, a network state (Anttiroiko, 2015; Laumann & Knoke, 1987). When it comes to world politics, net-
works have been regarded as a mode of organization that facilitates collective action and cooperation, exer-
cises influence, or serves as a form of international governance (Halfner-Burton et.al, 2009).
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       The theoretical aim of Castells (1996) was to present an analysis of the transformation of contemporary 
society as a grand theory, which adopted network logic as its explanatory scheme alongside informational-
ism and challenges the traditions of network analysis to reconsider the ways in which the network concept 
can be used in macro-level theorization (Anttiroiko, 2015). Analyzing power from the perspective of network 
theory, Rosenau (2005) used the term “Fragmegration” to describe the interaction of integration and frag-
mentation on the migration of authority as networked people versus public official who serve as nodes of 
authority. In addition, Kim’s (2008a) analysis of network power, network state, and networkarchy suggests 
that the mechanism of power politics implemented by new network actors surpassing the meaning of mate-
rial power, is owned by individual nodes (e.g., military, economic power) and is expanding into the dimen-
sion of immaterial power in the context of networks such as culture, norms, and diplomacy. 
      Approaching terrorism from a network standpoint can be an effective strategy to counter terrorism be-
cause it may reveal connections that were unrecognized such as identifying key actors and links (adversarial 
and cooperative), disentangling spatial proximity from organizational structures, and identifying how infor-
mational, human, and material resources may be leveraged (Stohl & Stohl, 2007). While physical terrorism 
only affects the specific place or area where the act took place, cyber terrorism has no spatial limits and the 
possibility that ‘infrastructure,’ social ‘structure’ and ‘system’, and ‘operating principles’ will become com-
promised continues to increase as cyber terror networks are comprised of multiple layers of networks (Kim, 
2017). While the application of network analysis to terrorist networks allows for new policy proposals to dis-
solve those networks, it also highlights that blanket assumptions in regard to their form and function are 
too simplistic (Halfner-Burton et.al, 2009).
      In an effort to lay out a comprehensive international cooperation framework in response to North Ko-
rea’s cyber terror attacks, the current study adopts perspectives from Kim’s (2008a) categorization of net-
work power, in which power derives not from the attributes of individual nodes, but from the ties between 
nodes as well as from the network as a whole. Kim’s framework categorizes network power into collective 
power, positional power and programming power. Collective power rests on the ability of larger networks to 
exert influence over smaller ones. Positional power derives from a particular position that a node occupies 
in a network. Programming power comes from the ability to set the rules of the game itself. These three 
concepts will be applied in the analysis of expert interviews.
      Viewed from the network theory, North Korea can be regarded as a node from an international perspec-
tive, while simultaneously being a network in itself, albeit a highly centralized one. It operates on an isolat-
ed and controlled scale with a hierarchy similar to that which can be observed in Cloward and Ohlin’s de-
scription of delinquent gangs. These gangs are organized hierarchically and members exhibit hostility and 
distrust towards representatives of the larger society (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960).
Differential Opportunity Structure in North Korea
     Differential opportunity theory integrates the theoretical perspectives of the sources of pressure that 
may cause deviance and the way in which the social structure may regulate deviant solutions. In Delin-
quency and Opportunity: A Study of Delinquent Gangs, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) explore the reasons be-
hind the development of delinquent norms.
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 4, Iss. 2, Page. 4-24, Publication date: August 2021.
7
North Korean Cyber Attacks and Policy Responses Hwang & Choi 
The main argument of the differential opportunity theory is well represented in the quote below:      
    As the theory has originally been applied to individual members of discrete societies, applying these 
theories to international relations can cause issues with those who do not agree with comparing a state to 
an individual actor. In fact, in international relations, the notion of the state as an indivisible “billiard ball” 
has been criticized for its simplicity. However, the network theory of world politics allows for North Ko-
rea to be seen as an individual node in addition to being a highly centralized network. North Korea has a 
unique political system in which the state’s goals are largely based on those of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-
un. The system allows for criminological analysis in the sense that 1) the Supreme Leader’s goals are un-
likely to face open opposition and 2) the state’s goals shape its cyber terror regime. Moreover, cyber-attacks 
as perpetrated by individuals differ from those perpetrated by those receiving compensation from a nation, 
as the latter may be seen as an instance of one nation directly compromising the security of the targeted na-
tion. In this case, war is possible in accordance with the seriousness of the crime (Kim, 2017).
     We have thus studied the theoretical applicability of North Korean cyber-attacks to select and draw 
upon the four factors of anomie, subculture, differential association, and North Korean cyber-attacks in 
more detail. The trend of cyber-attacks committed by North Korea includes the following three stages: ano-
mie caused by the difference between legitimate purposes and means, the resulting sub-cultural creation, 
and differential association/learning that leads to the persistent development of more cyber-attacks.
Anomie in North Korea Foreign Policy
     Durkheim emphasized the need for society to regulate the social goals of its members, to keep them 
within the limits of possible achievement, in order to avert tension, frustration, and consequent deviant be-
havior (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Durkheim (1897/1951) described anomie as occurring when human de-
sires are not sufficiently regulated. Durkheim’s conceptualization of anomie was built upon and revised by 
Merton (1938), who observed that anomie occurs when the balance between culture goals and institution-
al means is upset. Building upon this theoretical argument, Cloward & Ohlin (1960) asserted the pervasive 
feeling of position discontent leads individuals to compete for higher status and so contributes to the surviv-
al of the industrial order, but it also produces acute pressure for deviant behavior.
     Terrorist organizations have traditionally rejected culturally recognized means to achieve socially ac-
cepted goals and have provided organizations in certain countries with different interpretations of these 
goals (cf. Schmidt, 2012) (Choi et al, 2018). When applying the concept of anomie in international relations, 
national power is not readily coordinated with a competent organization of legitimate, i.e., international-
ly defined and accepted, means. This results in the tendency to lean toward illegitimate state action that is 
not condoned by other members of the international society.
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The disparity between what lower-class youth is led to want and what is actually available to them 
is the source of a major problem of adjustment. Adolescents who form delinquency subcultures, we 
suggest, have internalized an emphasis upon conventional goals. Faced with limitations on legiti-
mate avenues of access to these goals, and unable to revise their aspirations downward, they experi-
ence intense frustrations; the exploration of non-conformist alternatives may be the result (Cloward 
& Ohlin 1960, p. 86).
     Historically, North Korea’s foreign policy has not appeared to be overly influenced by international 
norms and regulations. Largely isolated from the international society and facing increasing sanctions, the 
legitimate means available for North Korea to reach its political or financial objectives are severely limit-
ed. This, in turn, leads North Korea to use illegitimate means (e.g., nuclear threats, money laundering) to 
achieve these goals. A dictatorship equipped with a lethal arsenal, unbounded by international norms, is es-
pecially dangerous (Cronin, 2014) with the development of IT. This continues to provide an easier channel 
for North Korea to make use of illegitimate avenues to pursue its goals.
Subculutre and Ideology of North Korea
     The theory of differential opportunity indicates that the deviant individual who is unable to gather so-
cial support will have greater difficulty in establishing firm grounds for the defiance of the official system, 
due to needing the justification of their beliefs and social validation of the appropriateness of deviant acts 
(Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Once the individual realizes insuperable discrepancies between goals and legiti-
mate means, a subculture must form within in order for delinquency to develop. This subculture will begin 
to acquire a set of beliefs and values that rationalize the shift in norms as a natural response to a trying sit-
uation (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Therefore, this subculture becomes the basis upon which social values and 
norms shift to provide support for deviant behavior to develop.
      North Korea’s isolation has provided ample opportunity for a unique subculture to develop that preced-
ed the development of IT and cyberspace. The most crucial elements of the delinquent subculture are the 
prescriptions, norms, or rules of conduct that define the activities required of a full-fledged member (Cloward 
& Ohlin, 1960). North Korea’s foreign policy has focused largely on patterns of offensive realism, aggressive 
revisionism and hyper-nationalism, and these patterns are retained by strict party-centered recruitment, 
education, and promotion of diplomatic elites (Kim et al., 2019). These patterns of foreign policy have been 
upheld by the Juche ideology, a “man-centered ideology” which focuses on self-reliance. This type of ideol-
ogy compels people to struggle against a hostile environment in order to turn it into a favorable one (Kim, 
2011). North Korea’s personal dictatorship is supported by this ideology in which the nation, the system, 
and the leader become one (Kim et al., 2019). After the death of Kim Il Sung, military-first politics began to 
function as the authoritative operating principle of North Korea. Thus, these two elements (Juche ideology 
and military-first politics) essentially assisted in justifying provocative actions such as ballistic missile and 
nuclear tests. Moreover, the development of the Internet makes cyber aggravation tactics more attractive. 
Part of the reason is that, compared with so-called “kinetic energy” actions (such as dropping bombs and 
firing bullets), cyber-attacks are anonymous, so it is difficult to attribute such attacks to a specific source 
(Kshetri, 2014).
Social Learning Mechanism in North Korea’s Cyber Army
  Although the formation of subcultures provides social and cultural justifications for deviant behavior, 
it is necessary for the behavior to be learned and passed down in order for deviant systems to emerge. The 
environment is key in order for the individual to acquire the values and skills, and a support system is nec-
essary once the individual has taken on that particular role (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Social learning is a 
cognitive process in which one’s character and environment are constantly participating in mutual interac-
tions. The principal view of this theory is centered around group power that endorses criminality (Akers et 
al., 1979).
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 4, Iss. 2, Page. 4-24, Publication date: August 2021.
9
North Korean Cyber Attacks and Policy Responses Hwang & Choi
       While this theory specifies how the rationalizations, norms, rules, and motivations of non-normative be-
havior are learned, it also defines the roles of positive and negative social mechanisms, all of which work to 
condition the “learner” toward or away from crime (Akers, 1985, 1992; Bandura, 1977; Winfree et al., 1994). 
North Korea continues to develop and invest in an elite cyber force under the control of its military, the Ko-
rean People’s Army, and the Reconnaissance General Bureau — Kim Jong Un’s clandestine security appa-
ratus (Ioanes, 2020). In fact, since the mid-1980s, this state established Mirim College, Moranbong College, 
among others, in which they train people to become professional hackers to enhance their cyber-attack-
ing capabilities (Boo, 2017). Dominant roles within delinquent subcultures often require the performance 
of deviant behavior (Cloward & Ohlin, 1998). Those who succeed will become cyber-soldiers secretly locat-
ed in East Asia, the Middle East, and South America, where they will perform cyber missions directed by 
the state (Kim &Yang, 2020). These cyber-soldiers are identified as threats to international security. For in-
stance, a cyber-soldier named Park Jin Hyok, was charged with executing high profile cyberattacks such as 
the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack and the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures (“FBI Charges”, 2018). While 
North Korea denies any connection with this cyber-soldier and the attacks and attribution is difficult due to 
the nature of cyber-attacks, this example illustrates how the development of a subculture encourages learn-
ing by individuals who agree with the norms of that subculture.
     As illustrated above, applying the concepts of anomie, subculture, and social learning is conducive to 
forming a better understanding behind North Korea’s motivations for cyber terror activities. North Ko-
rea lacks legitimate methods to achieve its national goals, which in turn, leads the state to use illegitimate 
means to achieve their objectives. The continued isolation of North Korea has created abundant opportuni-
ties for subcultures imposed by ideology to develop where their norms differ from those recognized by the 
international community. In addition, North Korea’s social learning mechanism creates more learning op-
portunities through differential association where members accept and perform these norms. As a result, a 
well-trained cyber army continues to grow and execute cyber terrorist attacks directed by the elite in North 
Korea.
Methodology
      This research utilizes a semi-structured expert interview approach to examine the ways in which ex-
perts in the fields of information security and cybercrime perceive North Korea’s cyber-attacks. The re-
sponses are then analyzed using the theory of differential opportunity and the network theory of world pol-
itics as conceptual frameworks, the former helping to explain motivations and patterns of North Korean 
cyber terror attacks and the latter providing implications for a way to regulate and counter these attacks.
      Qualitative interviews were conducted with eight national and information security experts in South 
Korea who were selected through a snowballing technique. Initially, four experts were asked and agreed to 
participate in the study: a professor in the field of cybercrime, an expert from the National Intelligence Ser-
vice, and two police officers. These four participants were chosen based on a purposive sampling method-
ology. The selection criteria were based upon the relevance of their work to addressing North Korea’s cy-
ber-attacks. All initial experts had at least ten years of experience in their respective fields, which included 
national security, cyber-terrorism and internet security. The original participants referred to other experts 
who were then contacted to participate in the study. The final sample consisted of two professors in cy-
ber-crime/information, two experts at the National Intelligence service, and four experts in the police force,
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all of whom have knowledge and experience with cyber terrorism. This sample was made up of seven males 
and one female, and there also existed variation in the years of experience, ranging from ten years of ser-
vice to more than twenty years of service. 
   The interview guide was structured so as to obtain responses about the trends, motivations and im-
pacts, the strengths and weaknesses of current prevention efforts, effective prevention strategies and sug-
gestions to policy makers. The initial questions were designed to be open-ended. These were followed by 
more structured questions to guide responses more specific to the study. An interview with an applica-
tion for permission to use the research with anonymity was sent to each participant by the first author. In-
terviews were then scheduled according to the availability of the experts, and interviews were conducted 
during a period of two months. Experts who consented to participate in the research were informed of the 
purpose of the study and the process. Confidentiality and anonymity of the responses were guaranteed and 
there were no marks in the interview questions to identify the personal information of the respondents. All 
interviews were conducted through an online conference platform or email due to COVID-19. All relevant 
responses were transcribed and used as a part of the analysis process after the interviews.
Policy Analysis via Expert Interviews
      This study explores motivations and trends of North Korean cyber terror attacks and analyzes the com-
mon stances that experts take in regard to deterrence of these cyber terror attacks. After interviewing a to-
tal of eight experts, the data collected was then subjected to a two-level analysis. With regard to motiva-
tions and trends, the theory of differential opportunity, and in particular the concepts of anomie, subculture 
and social learning formed the theoretical framework upon which the responses were analyzed. After the 
initial analysis, a secondary, more intensive analysis was conducted with regard to policy formulation. The 
network theory of world politics, and in particular the three concepts of collective power, positional power 
and programming power formed the basis upon which the responses were analyzed. The results of the anal-
yses are presented below.
Criminological Explanations of North Korean Cyber-Attacks: Motivation
     The theory of differential opportunity focuses on situations in which actors internalize conventional 
goals but are unable to realize them legitimately. Faced with limitations on legitimate avenues of access to 
these goals, and unable to revise their aspirations downward, they experience intense frustrations; the ex-
ploration of non-conformist alternatives may be the result (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Viewed from the con-
ception of anomie, North Korean cyber-attacks are not merely statements of belligerence or self-defense 
tactics. Rather, they reflect the strategic interests of the state when rising sanctions and international iso-
lation provide few avenues to realize them.
  Experts recognized that the conventional goals of state power and wealth inspired North Korea to de-
velop its cyber terrorist regime. It is commonly believed that the evolution of the Internet provided a new 
avenue for illicit activities that North Korea had a long history of being complicit in, and the purpose of ob-
taining confidential information transitioned to the objective of earning financial benefits. All of the inter-
viewed experts agreed that monetary gain in particular was a strong driving factor of North Korean cy-
ber-attacks. Several quotes illustrate this particular viewpoint:
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 In addition to confirming that the concept of anomie in the theory of differential opportunity holds in 
the case of North Korea, the responses formulated by experts show that motivations behind cyber terror can 
arise from changing state goals. While information was given precedence in the past, current trends illus-
trate the role of financial opportunity in pushing cyber terror attacks forward, with many experts mention-
ing bitcoin hacking and ransomware attacks. Cyber-attacks such as Ransomware are executed for the pur-
pose of procuring funds for the North Korean government and for further development of nuclear weapons. 
Ransomware attacks can inflict even wider destruction when compared to pharming malware. Since 2017, 
ransomware continues to be on the rise and must now be seen as a major form of North Korean cyber ter-
ror. In addition, for victims recovering from ransomware attacks has become increasingly expensive. More-
over, ransomware -related cybercrime costs are expected to exceed $20 billion this year, with a new ransom-
ware attack launched every 11 seconds (Solomon, 2021). Inevitably, monetary loss due to ransomware is 
only expected to increase in the future.
North Korea’s Subculture and Social Learning System
 The responses pertaining to understanding of North Korea’s subculture and social learning system were 
less robust compared to the concept of anomie, which could be more easily observed by analyzing trends of 
cyber-attacks from outside of North Korea. This was largely due to the reclusive nature of the state and the 
difficulty of knowing with any degree of accuracy the inner workings of North Korea’s subculture and social 
learning apparatus:
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 4, Iss. 2, Page. 4-24, Publication date: August 2021.
12
North Korean Cyber Attacks and Policy Responses Hwang & Choi
After 2011, North Korea has begun to use its hacking abilities to attack the private sector and to 
gain financial benefit. The targets of attack also spread out from the Korean peninsula, with the 
Sony Pictures attack of 2014, the Bangladesh Heist of 2016 and WannaCry of 2017 being the main 
cyber-attacks from North Korea (Expert 2, personal communication, March 13, 2021).
North Korea’s cyber-attacks began as methods to obtain confidential information about South Ko-
rea’s military and security programs but have become more diverse to include gambling, finance 
and virtual currency, a change which stems from their need for information but also for economic 
gain (Expert 4, personal communication, March 18, 2021).
Before 2017, North Korea’s motivations for cyber-attack were mostly because of need for informa-
tion but have since expanded to attacks on virtual currency trade centers and financial institu-
tions, and the targets of attack have changed from North Korean related targets such as govern-
ment officials and defectors to a more general target (Expert 6, personal communication, March 
26, 2021).
Based on the characteristics of the malignant codes and the methods of attack, security service 
centers Lazarus, Kimsuky and APT37- while in the past cyber terror attacks had the goals of theft 
and destruction of information, current trends see the rise of APT attacks aimed at obtaining for-
eign currency (Expert 8, personal communication, March 26, 2021).
North Korea’s cybercrimes are dangerous because of the difficulty of assessing potential damag-
es due to uncertainty about the exact extent of its cyber army and technology (Expert 6, personal 
communication, March 26, 2021).
      However, the responses in general showed that experts were aware of the social accepted status of cy-
bercrime in North Korea’s particular subculture as well as of the social learning system in place to perpetu-
ate the norms of the subculture:
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Focus on cyber terrorism is mainly limited to prevention and response to cyber-attacks on national 
security, thus focusing on the surface of the issue… the activities [related to cyber-attacks] are not 
well known and thus rather obscure (Expert 6, personal communication, March 26, 2021).
North Korea, in addition to its State Security Department, United Front Department and the Re-
connaissance Bureau has also established a team of hackers in its Ministry of Social Security, 
which is equivalent to the police force (Expert 1, personal communication, March 1, 2021).
      While an extensive amount of accurate information about North Korea’s cyber-soldier program is diffi-
cult to obtain, it has widely been accepted that North Korea’s Ministry of Social Security has established a 
hacker training center, ostensibly a research center, near the Institute of Natural Science and is training 
100 people from Kim Il-Sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology and selected students from 
high schools (Kim, 2021). Out of the three forms: criminal, conflict and retreatist subcultures defined in the 
theory of differential opportunity, the experts’ responses showed that North Korea’s subculture most closely 
resembles that of a “criminal subculture”, a type of gang devoted to theft, extortion, and other illegal means 
of securing income (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). 
      Moreover, it has been noted that North Korea handpicks teenage computer talents and actively trains 
and sponsors them, thus creating elite cyber-soldier army. The selection of cyber-soldiers begins at Pyong-
yang No. 1 Middle School, an elite educational institution whose curriculum is consistent with South Ko-
rea’s national high school curriculum (“Pyongyang no.1”, 2007). Selected talents from the No. 1 senior-mid-
dle school continue to receive elite IT education at Geumsung No. 1 and No. 2 senior-middle school’s 
‘specialized computer programs’, where those who stand out continue on as cyber-experts at Kim Il-Sung 
University, Pyongyang University of Computer Science, Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, 
and Hamhung University of Computer Technology (Kim & Yang, 2020). The most talented are selected for 
more specialized training and then deployed to hacking units. The competitive selection process of cyber-sol-
dier creation increases the prestige associated with securing a role in the cyber-soldier army and provides 
strong incentives for North Korean citizens to internalize their new roles through social learning while cre-
ating a subculture in which becoming a cyber-soldier is an elite privilege given only to the most talented.
The Network Theory of World Politics: Best Practices in Policies
 While there has been an abundant amount of research done on terrorism and network power in inter-
national relations, the network perspective has rarely been utilized to provide policy implications in the 
area of cyber-attacks. Thus, this study utilizes the network theory of world politics as a guide to build ef-
fective policies specifically aimed at deterring North Korea’s cyber-attacks, which are widely regarded as a 
form of terrorism.
Inter-Agency and International Cooperation
 Kim (2008) viewed network power as a functioning upon three mechanisms: the ‘actor’, the ‘process’, 
and the ‘system’. The ‘actor’, the first face of network power, may act as a ‘networker’ that gathers nodes to-
gether. Power exercised by the ‘actor’ functions much like collective power, in which the scale of the net-
work itself or the number of nodes in the network determines how powerful it is (Kim, 2008). The viewpoint 
of network power as collective power implies that larger networks with more powerful nodes can exert pow-
er over other nodes or networks. However, collective action between nodes in a network is a prerequisite in 
order for this power to function. Networked collective action, whether transnational networks of activists 
or illicit combinations of criminals or terrorists, may demonstrate greater capacity than its organizational 
competitors (Kahler, 2010).
 In international relations, it can be difficult to arrive at an agreement where collective action is possi-
ble. However, network power of international organizations/treaties is emphasized with regard to interna-
tional cooperation. Halfner-Burton & Montgomery (2006) found that membership in international organi-
zations partitions states into structurally equivalent clusters and establishes hierarchies of prestige in the 
international system. In the area of counterterrorist policy regulation, however, there has yet to be a ‘net-
worker’ that has the power to gather many nodes and exert enough collective network power to deter North 
Korea’s cyber-attacks. This is mainly due to cyber-attacks being relatively new and because there is no sin-
gle agreement even within single states as to how to legislate against cybercrime. Moreover, attribution of 
cyber-attacks remains difficult because even when an attacker is identified, it is not always possible to de-
termine whether the motivation behind the act arose from individual motives or an orchestrated attack 
from a state. Thus, it is difficult for states to justify retaliation against states and not individuals and to 
reach an international agreement in the area of cybersecurity.
 While an international agreement has been difficult to reach, it can be seen from the interview respons-
es that many experts agree that international cooperation is necessary. Indeed, most of the solutions sug-
gested by the experts during the interview rested upon an urgent need for collective power in the interna-
tional sphere, as shown by the following quotes:
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A continued state of vigilance by global corporations and foreign governments as they upgrade 
their cybersecurity systems must be kept in conjunction with international consensus about cyber-
security no longer being the problem of a single nation (Expert 2, personal communication, March 
13, 2021).
There have been international efforts to jointly deter cyber terror as can be seen in the Convention 
on Cybercrime. However, the varying legal systems and situations of countries mean that many 
countries including South Korea have not joined this agreement, which is problematic (Expert 2, 
personal communication, March 13, 2021).
Cyber-attacks often go through foreign servers, making international cooperation necessary. In or-
der for international cooperation to be facilitated, there needs to be a cooperation mechanism be-
tween states (Expert 7, personal communication, March 26, 2021).
     States such as North Korea that have internalized a delinquent subculture are not likely to abide by 
rules even if they are agreed upon. However, international cooperation can facilitate the monitoring and 
regulation of illicit cyber activities.
       Many efforts have been made by international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union (ITU), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to reach a consensus about appropriate rules for cyber 
behavior. Agreements that have been reached so far have not played pivotal roles in the regulation of cyber-
space. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a global governance model of pri-
vate-public partnership since it has been governed by an international board of directors drawn from across 
the Internet’s technical, business, academic, and other non-commercial communities (Kim, 2014).
 Suspicions of ICANN being a tool of de facto U.S. hegemony among other problems have prevented it 
from creating a profound change. The discrepancy between the common interest in international coopera-
tion and the mechanisms of actual cooperation between states has been causing difficulty for collective pow-
er to be exercised. Furthermore, respecting the acceptable boundaries of privacy conflicts while ensuring a 
high degree of cybersecurity, makes it difficult for states to act as ‘networkers’ even within their own bound-
aries. This second problem will be mentioned more deeply in relation to ‘programming power’.
Aligning Response through a Centralized Control Center
 The second face of network power is the ‘system’, in which power derives from the organization and 
principles of the network itself, with a ‘programmer’ designing the rules of the game (Kim, 2008). The 
“Washington Consensus” is a classic example of programming ability in action, and the controversial “Beijing 
Consensus” is often used to illustrate how China builds its own programming ability in areas traditional-
ly controlled by Western countries. Cybersecurity continues to lack a single ‘programmer’ and remains un-
clear whether the current discourse will allow for the rules of the game to be set by a unitary actor.
 Unlike traditional power, ‘programming power’ can also be exercised by less powerful actors. Kim (2014) 
analyzed middle powers exercising programming power and indicated that their power is concerned with 
the ability to complement and possibly renovate the whole system, designed by world powers. Due to South 
Korea’s geographical proximity and shared history with North Korea, it has the potential to exercise pro-
gramming power as a middle power. This would provide system adjustments/adaptations that increase in-
teroperability/compatibility, while reinforcing normative values and legitimation (Kim, 2014). Nevertheless, 
the lack of unified policy and unstable relations with North Korea continue to prevent South Korea and oth-
er states from realizing this potential. Due to the rapid development of technology and mercurial techniques 
of cyber-attacks, cyber security and cyber terror rules have yet to be established completely in many states. 
Thus, deciphering which actors are able to exercise programming power to deter cyber terror remains un-
solved. As mentioned above in the case of North Korea, the creation of a hierarchical system of cyber war-
riors and party affiliation means that the rules of the game can also be determined by the party.
 In other states, such a high level of centralization is difficult to reach. Nevertheless, experts have pro-
posed several ways in which a certain level of centralization can be reached, thus allowing the state to exer-
cise programming power in determining the rules of the game within their respective jurisdictions.
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National policies to increase investment in related sectors as well as active talent cultivation and 
improvement of awareness in the public and private sectors are necessary, and most of all there 
needs to be a central organization that can connect and control these separate areas (Expert 6, 
personal communication, March 26, 2021).
 Creation of a central oversight organization while ensuring that issues such as privacy are respected 
requires the rules of the game to be crafted in a way that enhances efficiency while not compromising val-
ues upheld by private and public networks.
Mediating Exchanges through Strategic Positioning
 Kim (2008) asserted that the ‘process,’ the third face of network power, focuses on the role of a ‘switch-
er’, which controls the level of access between networks. A structural analysis of networks equates the pow-
er of a particular node to its position in the network, defined by its persistent relationships with other nodes 
(Halfner-Burton et al., 2009). A concept central to the idea of positional power presented in the study is the 
structural idea of centrality. Freeman (1978) substantiated the idea of positional power by defining nine 
centrality measures based on the three conceptual foundations of degree, closeness, and betweenness.
      While degree centrality measures the amount of access a node has to other nodes, closeness centrality 
relates to the length between nodes. Degree, closeness and betweenness centrality in relation to cyber-at-
tacks are not proportional to the physical positions of the nodes. Rather, betweenness centrality corre-
sponds to the number of shortest paths in the network that pass through a particular node, thus, measur-
ing the dependence of a network on a particular node for maintaining connectedness (Halfner-Burton et.al, 
2009).
      A node with a high degree of betweenness centrality is at a structurally strategic position which allows 
it to play the role of broker either between nodes, between networks, or between networks and nodes. By 
bridging structural holes, brokers occupy central positions in a network structure, acting as nodes through 
which multiple transactions coalesce (Burt, 1992; Kim, 2014). Though the node itself might not have power 
in its degree and closeness centrality, brokerage allows the node to translate between different systems and 
thus gives it positional power in a network. Furthermore, brokerage may alter network structures, leav-
ing actors with a fundamentally different set of network ties, and changing the agenda in a network (Kim, 
2014).
 The international status of positional power is not conducive to preventing North Korea’s cyber terror-
ist activities. From a geopolitical point of view, China can promote exchanges between North Korea and 
other countries, thereby occupying a position with highly concentrated betweenness centrality. However, 
the current tensions between the U.S. and China make it unlikely for China to participate actively in U.S.-led 
international cooperative efforts to deter cyber-attacks from North Korea. The difficulties in making use of
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Cyber terror response at a national level can be positive in that quicker and systematic response is 
possible, a national and social safety net can be constructed, and there is possibility of this becom-
ing an advanced industry. However, costs due to administrative factors and certain regulations 
can also arise (Expert 3, personal communication, March 13, 2021).
Granted, in the area of internet technology a certain amount of decentralization is necessary in or-
der to facilitate innovation and growth. In the field of cybersecurity, there is more need than ever 
for the state to be able to exercise a certain amount of programming power. This is because the 
threat to security eventually determines predominance in competition between states in military, 
economic and social areas (Expert 3, personal communication, March 13, 2021).
betweenness centrality is not limited to traditional diplomatic relations between countries. The decentral-
ized nature of cyberspace provides an environment in which the state is still the central node, but many 
other nodes also face high stakes.
      In such a decentralized network, it is difficult for hubs to make an appearance. As a result, it is more 
difficult to see clusters of nodes that appear relative to single nodes or clusters. Thus, occupying a single 
position no longer necessarily means that a node will have high positional power. Identifying the gaps be-
tween nodes or networks and trying to connect these gaps imbue the nodes with a certain amount of power. 
If this does not oppose the trend of cyber-attacks, it will create waves and can slowly shift the trend.
 One way in which a state can exercise positional power is to play a brokerage role between the dispa-
rate networks of information and security. As the following quotes show, many experts are aware that it is 
common for cyber terror attacks as security issues and to respond to these attacks as such. However, many 
cyber terror attacks rely upon information from the public and private sectors, so a unified response is made 
difficult.
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As for national security, the National Cyber Security center, the Korean National Police Agen-
cy Cyber Bureau, R.O.K. Cyber Command prepare to deter North Korean cyber-attacks, but as 
for the public, the responsibility of protection falls first to the Korean Internet& Security Agency, 
making response less effective when the attacking force is North Korea (Expert 2, personal com-
munication, March 13, 2021).
Although government organizations are being set up, education is being reinforced and the phys-
ical defense system of separation between internal and external networks is being strengthened, 
hacking due to outflow of personal information from emails, and cellphones continues (Expert 4, 
personal communication, March 18, 2021).
Active surveillance of cyberspace is necessary, yet the changing political landscape makes this dif-
ficult… Surveillance of cyberspace relates to information practices, so it is difficult to arrive at an 
efficient response just using criminal law (Expert 2, personal communication, March 13, 2021).
      These statements illustrate the difficulties that a nation may face when attempting to act as a broker 
between the two networks of information and security. When these two are viewed as disparate and man-
aged differently, the hybrid nature of cyber terror complicates appropriate response. However, when the 
two networks of information of security can be connected by governmental policy or organizational reform, 
a more unified front can be presented, thus equally addressing the issues of national security and individu-
al privacy.
 In terms of Internet infrastructure, states must also be able to play the role of broker between inter-
nal and external internet networks, thus controlling the flow of information. The following quotes illustrate 
how a two-pronged approach in which the connection between internal and external networks may be con-
trolled and managed to reach more efficient response.
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In order to strengthen the security of internal computer networks, which are the ultimate goal of 
the attacker, strengthening the security of the connection point between internal and external net-
works can prevent or extend the infiltration of internal networks, giving administrators more time 
to perceive the problem (Expert 5, personal communication, March 26, 2021).
Primarily, a sort of fence in which international and national minimal security measures are real-
ized, and flexibility in which each sector of society has a tailored response in accordance with their 
situation is needed within this fence (Expert 3, personal communication, March 13, 2021).
 Thus, from the perspective of positional power, a state may play the role of broker by mediating ex-
changes between security and information networks as well as controlling changes between internal and 
external internet networks.
Figure 1. Best Practices in Policies Regarding North Korean Cyber-Attakcs.
Policy Implications and Discussion
 Analysis from the perspective of the network theory of world politics as well as insights from experts 
in cybersecurity showed that policy needs to focus on the ability of governments to exercise positional, pro-
gramming, and collective power. Collective power suggests policy response in the direction of creating com-
prehensive legal frameworks and forming stronger international agreement on response to cyber terror. 
Programming power suggests that governments include the public and private sectors when forming policy 
to deter cyber-attacks and to set the rules and norms of the game when it comes to cyber terror. Positional 
power suggests that governmental organizations or officers act as brokers between different networks, for 
example between the networks of information technology and security in order to more effectively respond 
to cyber terror attacks. These policy implications can be categorized into legal frameworks and international
cooperation, incident response and education.
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Legal Framework and International Cooperation
 Despite efforts to the contrary, most countries do not have a comprehensive legal framework that stip-
ulates regulations regarding cybercrime. South Korea’s legal system regarding cyber-crime is one example. 
Rather than a comprehensive law that incorporates the entirety of cybersecurity, there are individual pub-
lic and private laws that have less effect. The Cybersecurity Act, which was signed into law by the South 
Korean government in 2017, lost effect with the end of the term of the 20th congress. Laws pertaining to the 
public sector while stipulated in individual laws include the Framework Act on National Informatization 
and the Act on the Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure. Legislation pertaining to 
the private sector of society include the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Uti-
lization and Information Protection, etc. as well as the Electronic Financial Transactions Act (Kim & Yang, 
2020). The fragmented legislation between public and private sectors as well as the area of national securi-
ty prevents the government from more effectively responding to cyber-terror attacks. In addition to a com-
prehensive law that incorporates elements from the whole of cybersecurity, there needs to be a stipulation 
ensuring continuity of the law despite changes of government and congress.
       International cooperation has been similarly difficult to reach. Experts noted that cyber-attacks are be-
coming more directly related to relations between different countries:
Hacking, which in the past was done mainly by individuals or small groups with aims of money, 
glory and technological sense of superiority, has become a form of attack and defense in the dimen-
sion of cyber security with larger groups, organizations and states behind the attacks (Expert 3, 
personal communication, March 13, 2021).
 As of now, there is no comprehensive international cyber terror law that has legal effect. Past efforts by 
international organizations, including the Tallinn Manual which showed international agreement but failed 
to exercise legal power, have been conducted mainly in terms of normative approaches. However, without 
the support of more states and efforts to strengthen the power of international agreements, states will con-
tinue to be unable to exercise collective power on an international scale. In efforts to ensure that the costs 
of cyber-attacks outweigh the benefits, governments around the world could benefit from implementation 
of an arms control policy within cyberspace. Implementing a policy like this can help to establish an agree-
ment between nations in efforts to help diminish criminal acts within the cyberworld (Lee & Choi 2021; Nye 
2015).
Public Awareness and Cyber Ethics Education
 Another policy objective lies in public awareness and education buttressed by technical support. Exper-
ts emphasized the importance of public awareness about cyber-attacks:
North Korea tends to use phishing mails and phishing sites intended to retrieve information about 
the target of attack and uses this information to execute APT attacks, overtaking internal systems 
and stealing confidential information and monetary goods.
Phishing using social engineering tactics is often used, making it harder to detect. Special atten-
tion must be paid even to simple tasks like checking emails (Expert 8, personal communication, 
March 26, 2021).
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In the case of cyber terror, citizens and more widely the public are included in the beginning in-
formation collection stages, and when looking at just one section the whole entity becomes harder 
to perceive… in the case of cyber terror, information collection and damage occurs on a long time-
scale (Expert 6, personal communication, March 26, 2021).
 While public awareness has been recognized as crucial to preventing cyber-attacks more effectively, not 
enough is being done to raise that awareness. Educating the public about the importance of protecting wire-
less home networks with secure passwords can potentially minimize the risk of cyber terrorist attacks (Choi, 
2015). While the Association of Information Technology Professionals (AITP) and the Association of Com-
puting Machinery (ACM) have codes of ethics containing ethical rules governing the application of comput-
er practice, they have no legal power to improve their execution. Therefore, cybercrime awareness cours-
es should also consider cybercrime laws and regulations to increase awareness and support for laws against 
cyber-attacks.
       Proliferation of cyber ethics norms both nationally and internationally can also aid efforts to deter cy-
ber-attacks. Establishing a mandated ethics program and reinforcement is necessary to insulate and main-
tain appropriate cyberspace behaviors for the next generation of computer users (Choi, 2015). Although cy-
ber ethics standards are unlikely to become widespread, efforts to establish stricter standards for executing 
programming power can make states more legitimate to respond to cyber-attacks. In addition, the possi-
bility of integrating elements of cyber ethics into legislation and frameworks for international cooperation 
should be examined, and teaching ethics must always be accompanied by real-world applications.
Incident Response Policy
 The results of this study have shown that North Korean cyber terror attacks can result in massive 
damage in a short span of time. While long-term policy goals such as constituting legal frameworks as well 
as encouraging public awareness about cyber terror are important, immediate measures must be taken to 
ensure that states can respond to cyber terror attacks that are already taking place. Several quotes from 
experts show that the capabilities of officers can be necessary to ensure an agile response to cyber terror at-
tacks.
In addition to constructing hardware and software security technology, we need chief security offi-
cers in each institution to make sure that these technologies and policies are being used (Expert 3, 
personal communication, March 13, 2021).
Policies regarding the saving of digital forensic evidence and experts to analyze this evidence are 
necessary in order to provide quick detection of the nature of the attack, the magnitude of devasta-
tion and formulation of adequate response after a cyber-attack occurs (Expert 5, personal commu-
nication, March 26, 2021).
 As described from the quotes above, technical knowledge is necessary to effectively deter and respond 
to cyber-attacks at any job level in the field of cybersecurity. While recommendations to government agen-
cies provide a method to prevent cyber-attacks, it assumes that employees already have sufficient technical 
knowledge (e.g., how to patch systems, create back-up files) (Choi et al., 2021).
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 Unfortunately, most law enforcement officers lack the necessary skills and knowledge to conduct effec-
tive cybercrime investigations. Specialized cybercrime investigation training programs are warranted to 
meet the needs of local/state law enforcement agencies, and technical seminars are needed to ensure regu-
lations can be implemented in advance to respond to cyber terrorist attacks. In addition, collaboration be-
tween disciplines and transnational cooperation can help to combat the problem of technology-facilitated 
crimes in this novel field of cybercrime research. Future studies should be reactive and proactive when in-
vestigating, predicting, and examining the effects/origin of cybercrime utilizing information, technology, 
and global collaboration (Choi, 2021).
Figure 2. Policy Implications from the Three Faces of Network Power.
Conclusion
 This study examined the motivations, current trends, and characteristics of North Korean cyber terror 
attacks utilizing two different theories. Elements from the theory of differential opportunity included ano-
mie, subculture, and social learning, which were used to analyze the origins and motivations of North Kore-
an cyber-attacks. Insights from the network theory of world politics provided a basis to frame governmen-
tal policy response to North Korean cyber terror attacks. The concepts of collective power, positional power, 
and programming power were used to suggest further policy direction. The two interdisciplinary theoretical 
perspectives were then used to analyze expert interviews, thus forming a comprehensive understanding of 
current North Korean cyber-attacks as well as steps forward.
 This paper has contributed to prior research by integrating theories from criminology and international 
relations into one comprehensive framework and analyzing interviews from experts in the area of cyber se-
curity to provide validity and specificity to our theoretical approach. This study also has several limitations. 
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The sample size of experts available for interview was comparatively small at eight experts, and the contin-
ued spread of COVID-19 prevented the researchers from conducting face-to-face interviews that could have 
facilitated closer communication between the interviewer and interviewees. Future studies that incorporate 
a large sample size of experts can contribute to generalization of the results found by this study.
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